

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 04953 170940Z

21
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04

H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 IO-13 OMB-01 SAB-01 SSM-03 SAM-01 /076 W
----- 049289

R 161446Z JUL 76
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2335
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4953

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR LE IS
SUBJ: LEBANON: POSSIBLE SILVER LINING

REF: BEIRUT 6206

1. THERE MAY BE A SLIM POSSIBILITY THAT THE PRESENT TURMOIL
IN LEBANON MIGHT IN SOME WAY EVOLVE SO THAT MEANINGFUL
NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT COULD BE GIVEN
SOME IMPETUS. WHILE SUCH AN EVOLUTION IS DIFFICULT TO
SEE AT THIS TIME, IT IS ONLY PRUDENT FOR THE U.S. TO BE ALERT
TO THE POSSIBILITY AND PREPARED TO SEIZE ANY OPPORTUNITY.

2. HOWEVER, THE SUGGESTION IN PARA 9 OF THE REFTEL REQUIRES
VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. TO MAKE "THE CREATION OF A
PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE WEST BANK A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF
U.S. POLICY" WOULD BE GRATUITOUS AND IN ALL LIKELIHOOD
COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. IF THE U.S. WERE PUBLICLY TO ANNOUNCE ITS
ADVOCACY OF A PALESTINIAN STATE--AND WE BELIEVE A PUBLIC
STATEMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE DEISRED EFFECT--

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 04953 170940Z

IT WOULD APPEAR TO MANY OBSERVERS TI BE A REWARD TO THE PLO FOR

ITS POLICIES OF TERRORISM AND NON-ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338; WHILE U.S. MIGHT USE THE WORD PALESTINAIN, MOST OBSERVERS HERE WOULD READ PLO. RAHTER THAN ADOPT THE SUGGESTED POLICY, WHICH APPEARS TO US TO BE ONE WHICH WOULD REINFORCE UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR, IT WOULD APPEAR MORE EFFICACIOUS TO CONTINUE OUR PRESENT POLICY. WE THEREBY COULD CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE PLO WHICH, SEEN FROM HERE, SEEMS CLEARLY ON A DOWN-HILL TREND AND WILL PROBABLY NEVER AGAIN BE THE ORGANIZATION IT WAS JUST A FEW MONTHS AGO.

3. THE SUGGESTED POLICY OBVIOUSLY WOULD BRING US INTO SHARP AND DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. THE "THIRD STATE" CONCEPT AND ANY DEALINGS WITH THE PLO ARE FIRMLY OPPOSED BY ISRAELI LEADERS. RABIN IN HIS JUNE 15 FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT REAFFIRMED THE CABINET'S JULY 1974 POSITION THAT ISRAEL CONTINUES TO SEE A JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN STATE AS THE EXPRESSION OF PALESTINIAN IDENTITY (TEL AVIV 4135). THIS, OF COURSE, EXCLUDES A "PURELY" PALESTINIAN THIRD STATE, WHICH IT IS BELIEVED HERE CAN ONLY BE ONE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PLO--EITHER IMMEDIATELY OR AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP. (RABIN ALWAYS REFERS TO THE PLO AS THE "TERRORIST" ORGANIZATION.) MOSHE DAYAN WENT FURTHER JULY 14 IN SAYING FLATLY THAT THE WEST BANK MUST REMAIN UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL, ALTHOUGH JEWS AND ARABS COULD BOTH LIVE THERE.

4. THE OPPOSITION OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND MAINSTREAM ISRAELIS TO AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN HAS BEEN REINFORCED BY THE AIR FRANCE HIJACKING AND THE CONTINUED FIGHTING IN LEBANON--BOTH OF WHICH ISRAELIS SEE AS CONFIRMING THEIR VIEW THAT THE PLO IS AN ILLEGAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WHICH CANNOT EVEN CONTROL ITS MEMBERS MUCH LESS BE CONSIDERED A LEGITIMATE PARTNER FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

5. IN SUM, ISRAELIS CONTINUE TO SEE ANY INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS AN ARAFAT STATE AND A TOOL OF THE SOVIETS. INDEED, THE SPECTACLE OF SYRIAN FORCES FIGHTING THE PLO HAS RAISED SOME RENEWED EXPECTATION THAT JORDAN MAY AGAIN BECOME A NEGOTIATING PARTNER AS REGARDS THE DISPOSITION OF THE WEST BANK. ISRAELI LEADERS ALSO BELIEVE THAT ASAD HIMSELF PROBABLY DOES NOT WANT TO SEE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 04953 170940Z

A PLO STATE ON THE WEST BANK (IN THIS CONNECTION SEE KUWAIT'S 3364).

6. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, ADOPTION OF THE POLICY PROPOSED IN PARA 9 WOULD INVOLVE PAYING A CLEAR COST (CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOI) IN RETURN FOR A HIGHLY UNCERTAIN GAIN (ALLEVIATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN LEBANON). SUCH A U.S./GOI CONFRONTATION WOULD ITSELF BE SHARP ENOUGH TO INTRODUCE A

NEW ELEMENT OF INSTABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND MIGHT
WELL BRING DOWN THE PRESENT RABIN GOVERNMENT.
DUNNIGAN

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, POLICIES, TERRORISM, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 JUL 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: greeneet
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976TELAV04953
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760276-0528
From: TEL AVIV
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760748/aaaabqdz.tel
Line Count: 118
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 BEIRUT 6206
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: greeneet
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAY 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <07 OCT 2004 by greeneet>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: LEBANON: POSSIBLE SILVER LINING
TAGS: PFOR, LE, IS, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006